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A. Rule Against Perpetuities
B. Tennessee Class Doctrine
The subject matter will be discussed under the -three headings
indicated above. The developments of the year' include court de-
cisions and relevant new legislation enacted by the Eighty-second
General Assembly of the State of Tennessee. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant development of probate law in Tennessee during the period
was the enactment of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Act,2 referred to generally as the "pour-over" statute.3 Very likely
this statute will have a substantial and dramatic impact upon (1)
the arrangements of decedents' estates, and (2). the future role that
the executor and the lawyer will have in the settlement of decedents'
estates. Though this development involves a blending of separate
dispositions by an inter vivos trust instrument and a will, it will be
discussed under the heading of Decedents' Estates because .of its
importance to that area of the law.
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Nashville and Tennessee
Bars.
1. The year covered by this article extends from June "1, 1960, through May
31, 1961. The court decisions discussed are reported in volumes.,,of the
Southwestern. Reporter, Second Series, beginning with 334 S.W.2d 632 and
extending through 345 S.W.2d, 600.
2. TENN. COD.n.AN. §.32-307 (Supp. 1961).,





There is still no statutory time limit in Tennessee within which a will
must be probated in order to be an effective death disposition.4 Never-
theless, Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-610 (as amended in
1957) protects a bona fide purchaser and mortgagee from the heir
against the title and rights of all devisees and legatees claiming under
an unprobated will of a decedent, if the purchase or mortgage is
made more than one year after the date of the decedent's death.
The legislative amendment eliminated a title hazard which had
existed for many years in Tennessee; the full impact of this hazard
was realized only after the mortgage banker in First Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n v. Dearth5 suffered a financial loss.6
In Doughty v. Hammond7 the Supreme Court of Tennessee sustained
the 1957 legislative amendment mentioned above against a constitu-
tional attack; it was contended that the act deprived the devisee of
his property without due process of law and denied him the equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed by both the Tennessee and the
United States constitutions. After pointing out that the state has the
power to prohibit entirely the transmission of wealth by will or
intestate succession, and that this includes the lesser power to pre-
scribe a time limit for probating a will, the court emphasized that a
one year time limit cannot be said to be unreasonable, and that it
provides an "expeditious administration of a person's estate to be able
to know whether there shall be an administrator, or an executor
under some will."8 Certainly the primary object of any system of ad-
ministering a decedent's estate should be to provide for an orderly
system whereby creditors' claims, taxes and other preferred expenses
can be paid, and the remaining property distributed in a way that
will be fully protected under the law. In the instant case an heir at
law commenced a partition suit with respect to the land within two
months after the date of death; a sale to the plaintiffs was confirmed
one week after the expiration of the one year period, and the de-
cedent's holographic will was not discovered until seven months after
4. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dearth, 198 Tenn. 304, 279 S.W.2d 503
(1955). It is said that TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-113 (1956) does not apply to
wills. Doughty v. Hammond, 341 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tenn. 1960).
5. 198 Tenn. 304, 279 S.W.2d 503 (1955).
6. For other discussions (a) showing the need for such legislation in
Tennessee and (b) commenting upon the legislation as enacted, see Traut-
man, Real Property-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1089-92 (1956);
Roady, Real Property-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1188, 1201-
02 (1957); Trautman, Wills, Trusts and Estates-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10
VAND. L. REv. 1238, 1240 (1957).
7. 341 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1960).
8. Id. at 717.
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the confirmation, or a year and seven months after decedent's death.
Though one may understandably sympathize with the defendant who
was named as devisee in the unprobated will, the interests of society
seem to clearly predominate; without such legislation the title to the
property owned by every decedent who died intestate would be
unmarketable for many years because of the hazard of an unprobated
will.
Two further comments come to mind with respect to this case:
First, the holographic will is not only terribly expensive,9 but also
is frequently difficult to find; one result of this is that the beneficiaries
named may lose the substance of their gifts. Secondly, if heirs at
law or next of kin of an intestate have any fear that a will of the
decedent might eventually be produced, they may wish to arrange a
sale to be completed one year after the decedent's death. While
there is still no statute of limitations which will prevent the probate
of a will in Tennessee, the failure to do so within one year after
the decedent's death may indeed result in unfortunate consequences.
Smith v. Weitzel' ° is a strange case in the Tennessee law of wills,
and it is submitted that it is an unfortunate one. A statement of the
facts reflects what would seem to be (1) bad planning of the de-
cedent's will and estate, (2) an abundance of litigation which has
occupied the time and attention of five separate courts in Tennessee
(the writer is informed that the case is now again in the chancery
court for further construction of the decedent's will), and (3) a
written opinion by the middle section of the court of appeals which
could be construed in a way that would be an unfortunate precedent.
The testatrix left a written will and codicil which were duly executed
and witnessed. The third item was a special devise of her residence,
and the fourth item gave the residue to A, B and C. The difficulty
concerns the second item which stated the purpose and intention to
give "certain of my relatives . . . stocks and/or bonds, which items I
propose to allocate to each and place in envelopes bearing the name
of each such relative and leave in my Safe Deposit Box." The
testatrix was apparently advised that this would save administration
expenses since she stated that "This property I do not wish handled
under the executorship hereinafter set up, but my executor shall
deliver same to the named relatives without responsibility other than
to take the proper receipt therefor and to declare same and pay
any inheritance or other taxes due thereon out of the residue of my
estate .... ." Before this estate is finally settled the litigation expenses
9. Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1959 Ten-
nessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. Ruv. 1157, 1181-82 (1959).
10. 338 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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will greatly exceed the cost of competent advice by a professional
estate planner. The relatives are not named in the decedent's will,
and it does not appear from the will that the envelopes were in
existence when the will was executed or that testatrix had made
the allocation that she proposed. In the bank deposit box of the
testatrix, were found seven envelopes which contained corporate
securities. She had written upon each envelope only (1) the name
of a relative, (2) a description of the contents, and (3) her signature;
there was no language of gift or testamentary disposition on the
envelopes. One of the original securities allocated among the en-
velopes was General Motors stock which split three-for-one between
the execution of the will and the death of the testatrix. The testatrix
had directed her banker to allocate the additional shares among the,
envelopes in the same proportion.
The written will and codicil were probated in the county court. The
executor immediately filed a bill in the chancery court for a con-
struction of the will, raising the question whether or not the seven
envelopes containing the major part of the assets of the estate should
be considered as parts of the will. Some of the beneficiaries con-
tended that the writing on the envelopes constituted a valid bequest
of the contents. Other beneficiaries took the position that the securi-
ties passed under the residuary clause to A, B, and C. Still others
asserted that the envelopes and their contents were not part of the
decedent's estate. The chancery court upon motion suspended pro-
ceedings until a petition could be filed in the county court to probate
the envelopes as a part of the will. Because the petition to probate
the envelopes was opposed, the county court determined that a will
contest was presented and certified the proceedings to the circuit
court." Since the only issue in this case-whether or not the envelopes
can be integrated with the written will and codicil-seems to be purely
a question of law, it is doubtful that this is the type of issue which
can be certified to the circuit court under its statutory authority to
determine issues of- devisavit vel non.12 In this case, however, the
jury decided that the envelopes constituted a part of the decedent's
will, and a decree of the circuit court based upon the jury verdict
11. TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 32-401 to -410 (1956) provide that when a will "is
contested" the county court shall cause the fact to be certified to the circuit
court for trial of the "issue of devisavit vel non." This technical Latin phrase
means "Did he devise or not? An issue devisavit vel non is an issue of fact
as to whether a will in question was made by the testator as his own respon-
sible act." BAIJ..NTINE, LAw DIcTIoNARY cited in 1 PRITcHARD, WILLs § 366
n.1, (1955). The purpose of the statute seems clear-that the trial of facts
involving due execution, mental capacity, fraud, undue influence and similar
issues of fact are particularly suited for trial by jury, and should therefore
be sent to the circuit court, which specializes in jury trials.
12. See note 11 supra.
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was entered. On appeal, the middle section of the court of appeals
held that the verdict of the jury was supported by substantial evi-
dence that the testatrix intended to make testamentary gifts by use
of these envelopes and that therefore she intended that her will
should be "composed of the type-written document signed, ack-
nowledged and witnessed, plus the envelopes . ... ,1us Unfortunately,
this decision seems to miss the problem completely. As was said by
a New York surrogate in a very similar case, "The question is not
what did the testator intend to do, but what has he done in the light
of the statute."' 4 There would seem to be no question of fact at all
concerning either the intention of the testatrix or her acts in carrying
out her intention. The only real problem in the case seems to be to
determine the legal effect of her acts and intention when measured
by the Tennessee Statute of Wills. Because it would seem to involve
only an issue of law, it is difficult to understand why this case was
allowed to be submitted to a jury. Both a demurrer and motion for a
directed verdict were overruled by the circuit court, and the writer
is informed that those who opposed recognition of the envelopes
refused to argue the case before the jury, stating in open court that
the question was purely one of law.
It would seem that the first error was made by the chancellor when
he was persuaded to suspend the entering of his decree in order to
permit the envelopes to be offered for probate; he had already ren-
dered a written opinion holding that the contents of the envelopes
passed under the residuary clause. The county court, circuit court,
and court of appeals seem to have made the second, third and fourth
errors as indicated above. There are those who oppose a single court
with exclusive probate and civil jurisdiction to try all issues arising
in such matters; they justify the present Tennessee system of divided
jurisdiction on the ground that since each court performs a specialized
function, it will be done better. This case, however, is apparently an
unfortunate example of over-specialization with no one court having
a broad enough perspective to recognize the problem raised as only
a question of law.
An analysis of the substance of this case should start with the
proposition of law that a will is restricted to the papers which were
assembled at the formal execution of the decedent's will. There
are three doctrines which severely strain, but do not breach, this basic
proposition. They are: (1) the doctrine that a will may consist of
several separate pages which may be integrated and validated by a
single act of execution; (2) the doctrine of incorporation by reference;
13. 338 S.W.2d at 635.
14. In re Angle's Will, 147 Misc. 445, 264 N.Y.S. 29, 37 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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and (3) the doctrine of independent significance or non-testamentary
acts. The Weitzel case cannot be squared with the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference on several grounds-the will does not identify
particular envelopes; it does not appear that the envelopes were in
existence when the will was executed; and since the doctrine con-
templates the incorporation of a writing, the words on the envelope
do not include words of gift.15 Nor does the Weitzel case square with
the doctrine of independent significance of non-testamentary acts be-
cause it is perfectly clear from the will itself that the putting of
securities in the envelopes had no significance to the testatrix which
was independent of a testamentary disposition.16 The first doctrine
mentioned-that the integrated will may consist of separate pages
validated by a single act of execution-is the theory which seems to
come nearest to sustaining the Weitzel decision. Even there, however,
it must appear that all the separate writings are present at the time
of execution. A close reading of the Weitzel opinion does not prove
convincingly that this was true. The court talks about the dates on
some of the stock certificates in order to imply that the envelope in
which it was found was present at execution, but the presence of a
particular envelope and the writing on it can hardly be inferred from
the dates of some of the certificates in it. It seems clear that this
testatrix could have substituted at will new envelopes with new
names from time to time, and that she could have changed the con-
tents of existing envelopes as her thoughts varied from day to day.
There is nothing in her will to indicate anything other than that this
was her purpose in the use of such envelopes.
As a matter of policy this seems to be an unfortunate decision
because it provides judicial encouragement to devious methods of
frustrating the legislative requirements of the statute of wills.' 7 Such
decisions contribute to a delinquency in estate planning on the part
of many testators, at a cost that frequently runs into many thousands
of dollars in litigation expenses and prolonged delay in estate settle-
ments. All this could be largely avoided at nominal cost with the
help of competent professional advice. If the will in the instant
case had named the legatees whose names were found on the en-
velopes it would have given the case a somewhat marginal status; 8
but to state nothing more than a purpose to give certain relatives
15. See ATKINSON, WILLs § 80, (2d ed. 1953).
16. Id. § 81.
17. For another decision of this character see In re Jones' Estate, 44 Tenn.
App. 323, 314 S.W.2d 39 (W.S. 1957), discussed in Trautman, Decedents'
Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 1157, 1163 (1959).
18. Daniel v. Tyler's Executors, 296 Ky. 808, 178 S.W.2d 411 (1943); In Re
Le Collen's Will, 190 Misc. 272, 72 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Atkinson,
op. cit. supra note 15, § 90, at 395.
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some stocks "which... I propose to allocate to each ... in envelopes
bearing the name ...... does not seem to satisfy the requirements of
integrating separate papers as a single will.19
In re Eppinger's Estate2o held that where a previous court of appeals
decision had directed that the costs of a will contest on mental capacity
should be paid from the estate, the term "costs" does not include the
allowance of attorneys' fees for the unsuccessful contestants.
Kelley v. Brading2 ' was a will contest in which undue influence was
an issue. The trial court was reversed for refusal to give a requested
instruction. This instruction was to the effect that if the jury found
that a beneficiary named in the will had been in a confidential re-
lationship with the decedent prior to the will and had caused the will
to be drafted and executed, the law would presume that the bene-
ficiary had exercised undue influence and would cast the burden of
proof upon the beneficiary to show that he did not exercise undue
influence. The beneficiary here was the circuit court clerk who for
many years had handled the business affairs of the decedent.
In Patton v. Gleaves2 the decedent, a marine who was shot down in
1951, was officially declared dead in 1954 after more than $12,000
had accrued in unpaid salary. Under the statutes on intestate succes-
sion his divorced parents would succeed to his estate. The decedent
had filled out and sworn to a printed form used by the Marine Corps
entitled "Record of Emergency Data" which designated his father as
the person to be notified in case of emergency, and as the person
to receive all of his pay. On the basis of this form the county judge
awarded the accrued salary, which was the decedent's entire estate,
to his father. On appeal the supreme court reversed and held that the
printed form was in effect a document for the administrative con-
venience of the Marine Corps in disposing of property and other
details, and that it was neither a will nor an assignment of the son's
pay to the father; instead the salary was to be administered as estate
property and distributed to next of kin-in this instance to both
parents.
B. Intestate Succession
While the Married Woman's Emancipation Act of 19132 sub-
stantially eliminated in Tennessee the common law concept of a hus-
19. For a similar case holding the provision in the will for sealed envelopes
void see In re Angle's Will, 147 Misc. 445, 264 N.Y.S. 29 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
20. 336 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1960).
21. 337 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
22. 334 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1960).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-601 (1956). See also § 32-111 concerning a mar-
ried woman's capacity to make a will. This is an older statute derived from
Tenn. Pub. Acts of 1851-1852.
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band's estate by curtesy initiate,24 it did not abolish the husband's
estate of tenancy by the curtesy consummate.25 Tennessee Code An-
notated sections 32-111 and 36-602 expressly so declare. After the
wife's death the husband is entitled to a life estate in all her freehold
property, legal or equitable, provided issue has been born alive
capable of inheriting the freehold estate.26 While it has been said
often that the right of curtesy extends only to lands in which the
wife had seisin,2 7 it is clear that the requirement of seisin means that
the husband is entitled to curtesy only in those inheritable estates
in which the wife has a present possession, or right to present pos-
session,28 regardless of whether she has a legal or an equitable estate
of inheritance.2 9 It does not extend to lands in which she owns a
future interest which does not become a present possessory interest
during her life.
30
These principles of law were involved in a recent Tennessee case.
In Roten v. Hicks31 a father died intestate leaving 210 acres of land
and a widow and two married daughters. The daughters and their
husbands executed voluntary partition deeds dividing the lands, the
deeds in each instance conveying a particular tract to a daughter and
her husband as tenants by the entirety. Each deed was "subject to
the life estate" of their mother "who holds said land as a homestead
during her lifetime."32 Eight days after the partition deeds one of the
daughters died leaving her husband and six children as well as her
mother surviving her. The mother died three years later, and four
24. Schaffler v. Handwerker, 152 Tenn. 329, 278 S.W. 967 (1926); Day v.
Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S.W. 911, (1918).
25. Schaffler v. Handwerker, 152 Tenn. 329, 278 S.W. 967 (1926); Hull v.
Hull, 139 Tenn. 572, 202 S.W. 914 (1918).
26. Shearin v. Shearin, 161 Tenn. 172, 29 S.W.2d 254 (1930); 1 AMEICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.57, at 770 (Casner ed. 1952).
27. Shearin v. Shearin, 161 Tenn. 172, 174, 29 S.W.2d 254 (1930); Guion v.
Anderson, 27 Tenn. 298 (1847); McCorry v. King's Heirs, 22 Tenn. 267, (1842);
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.57-.61 (Casner ed. 1952).
28. A constructive seisin of lands not adversely held will suffice. McCorry
v. King's Heirs and Guion v. Anderson, supra note 27. Where a daughter
endows her mother, marries, has issue, and then dies before her mother,
it was held that the husband of the daughter will not be entitled to an
estate of curtesy in the lands endowed "because the daughter's seizin was
defeated by the endowment." Reed v. Reed, 40 Tenn. 491 (1859). See in
addition the instant -case of Roten v. Hicks, 338 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1960); Verhine v. Ragsdale, 96 Tenn. 532, 35 S.W. 556 (1896); Upchurch v.
Anderson, 62 Tenn. 410 (1874); Prater v. Hoover, 41 Tenn. 544 (1860); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.59, 5.61, at 780, 785-87 (Casner ed. 1952).
29. Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075 (1916); Templeton v. Twitty,
88 Tenn. 595, 606, 14 S.W. 435 (1890); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.61,
at 787 (Casner ed. 1952).
30. Reed v. Reed, 40 Tenn. 491, (1859). See additional Tennessee cases
cited in note 28 supra. Also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.59, .61 (Cas-
ner ed. 1952).
31. 338 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
32. Id. at 228, 229.
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years after that the land was sold for failure to pay taxes. The
purchasers were the two sons-in-law, who divided the land between
themselves individually in the same way that it had been divided
before in the deeds executed by the daughters. The husband of
the deceased daughter then conveyed his land to one of his sons, who
is the principal defendant; the plaintiffs were some of his other chil-
dren. The chancellor held that upon the death of the daughter her six
children became the owners as tenants in common, subject to the
homestead and dower rights of their grandmother, and subject to the
estate by the curtesy of their father. Accordingly, the chancellor
further held that because the son-in-law held a life estate by curtesy
in present possession after the death of his mother-in-law, his later
purchase of the property for delinquent taxes amounted to a re-
purchase which "operated as a redemption of the land for the benefit
of himself and children. '2 3 Therefore, only a life estate was conveyed
by deed to the defendant, the remainder being owned by all. the six
children of the deceased daughter. The court of appeals reversed the
chancellor and held that no estate of curtesy could attach to the
interest of the deceased daughter because her interest was a future
interest subject to a life estate of her mother; after the death of
their grandmother, the six children owned her land in fee simple,
and their father was not held to be in a relationship of confidence to
them when he purchased their land for delinquent taxes. Accordingly,
the court of appeals sustained the sole ownership of the property by
the defendant grandson on the basis of the conveyance to him and the
tax deed to his father.
Three additional technical points are implicit in this case. .(1) -Since
the right of curtesy attaches to all the wife's lands, rather than to a
fractional share, there apparently is no necessity for a petition for an
assignment as in the case of dower.34 (2) While there was no petition
for an assignment of dower in favor of the grandmother, the court
held that the voluntary partition deeds executed by the daughters
expressly provided for the life estate of the grandmother. (3) The
grandmother's dower would ordinarily be a life estate in only one-
third of the land owned at death by her husband, giving the daugh-
ter's husband an estate of curtesy in that portion of the land not
subject to dower on the death of the daughter; in this case, however,
(a) there was nothing in the record to indicate that the value of the
land was more than the value of a homestead as fixed by the con-
33. Id. at 232. See Morrow v. Person, 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665 (1953)
and Trautman, Future Interests and Estates-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7
VAND. L. REV. 843, 849 (1954) for a further discussion of this principle and
authorities.
34. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.57, at 770 (Casner -ed. 1952).
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stitution, and (b) the daughter in any event would be estopped to
deny that they gave their mother a life estate in all the lands by their
partition deeds.
Delamotte v. Stout 35 held that a child adopted under a Missouri
adoption statute was not entitled to inherit real and personal property
located in Tennessee from a deceased sister of the adopting parent,
notwithstanding the fact that the Missouri statute creates for an
adopted child the right to inherit from a brother or sister of the
adopting parents. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-126 limits
the right of inheritance to those within the adoptive family, and does
not include a right to inherit from collaterals. The court said that
the law of the place where the property is situated, or the law of the
decedent's domicile controls the right of inheritance when in con-
flict with the law creating status.36 The court felt that it should not
grant to citizens from other states a right which this state does not
grant to its own citizens.
C. Probate Administration
Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-518 provides that the probate
or county court "shall hear and determine all issues arising upon
all" exceptions to claims filed against an estate; it further provides for
an appeal from the judgment entered thereon to the court of appeals
or to the supreme court, as the case may be. In Rowan v. Inman
37
a claim was filed against an estate in the county court and efforts
were made to negotiate it. The time for filing exceptions to the
claim expired, so that the county court sustained a motion to strike
the exceptions which were later filed. The executrix filed an original
bill in chancery for relief from the judgment of the county court,
alleging that the attorney for the claimant initiated negotiations to
compromise the claim and misled the executrix by assurances that
the rights of neither -party would be prejudiced if no compromise
was attained. The supreme court affirmed the chancellor who dis-
missed the bill for lack of jurisdiction. The county court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to determine all issues concerning claims and
exceptions thereto, and the lawyer handling a case involving such
issues must make his record in the county court. An appeal can
be taken to the court of appeals or the supreme court, depending on
whether the case was considered by the county court on evidence
presented at a trial, or was decided on a demurrer or other method
not involving a review of the facts; the former are appealed to the
35. 340 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1960).
36. Citing Cole v. Taylor, 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 61 (1915); Finley v. Brown,
122 Tenn. 316, 123 S.W. 359 (1909).
37. 338 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn. 1960).
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court of appeals, and the latter to the supreme court.38 The statute
is held to exclude any basis for jurisdiction in the chancery court.
Trice v. Cheatam39 involves the same problem. The supreme court
affirmed a judgment of the circuit court dismissing an action for a
declaratory judgment and for writs of error and certiorari to the
county court to bring claims fied in the county court to the circuit
court for trial by jury. The court said that Tennessee Code Anno-
tated sections 30-517 and 30-518 provide a speedy and an adequate
remedy at law for the handling of all issues involving claims against
an estate and exceptions to claims.
While there are many instances in our statutes where the chancery
and circuit courts have concurrent, appellate, or special jurisdiction
with respect to certain issues presented in the county court, it seems
crystal clear from supreme court decisions during the last two years
that issues arising out of claims and exceptions thereto are not in this
category.40 It is indeed a difficult problem for lawyers concerned with
probate administration to keep in mind those matters which can be
considered by chancery and circuit courts and those in which the trial
record must be made in the county court above.
D. Legislation
Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-611 provides that the desig-
nation of a death benefit to a beneficiary contained in a pension,
profit-sharing, stock-bonus or retirement plan in accordance with rules
prescribed in the plan shall be exempted from the formalities of the
Statute of Wills. Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-602 authorizes
a testamentary gift by will of the human anatomy or parts thereof
to certain classes of institutions.
The most important legislation concerning decedents' estates enacted
in 1961, however, is the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Act. It is chapter No. 303 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1961, all
four sections of which are published in the pocket supplement as
Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-307. This type of statute is
generally referred to as a "pour-over" statute.41 As indicated in the
introduction, it is entirely possible and perhaps likely that this statute
will have a substantial and dramatic impact upon (1) estate planning
arrangements for decedents' estates, and (2) the future role that the
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-408 (1956) and cases cited in notes 3-5 under it.
39. 344 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. 1961).
40. Compare Teague v. Gooch, 333 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1960), with the comment
in Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1960 Tennessee
Survey, 13 VAIm. L. REv. 1101-03 (1960).
41. CAsNER, EsTATE PLANNING 118 (3d ed. 1961); Polasky, "Pour-Over"
Wills-And the Statutory Blessing, 98 TRUSTs AND ESTATES 949 (1959).
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executor and the lawyer will have in the settlement of decedents'
,estates.
A "pour-over" is usually a testamentary gift of all or a portion of
the residue to the trustees of an existing inter vivos trust, the testa-
mentary gift to be added to the corpus of the living trust.42 Among
the objectives sought to be accomplished by this coordination of an
inter vivos trust and a will are the following: (1) to keep the terms
of the trust secret by not having them probated as a part of the will;
(2) to choose the law of a state more favorable than the law of the
domicile to govern the inter vivos trust; (3) to save the bulk of
probate expenses by reducing the size of the decedents' estate; (4)
to avoid the necessity of administering two separate smaller trusts-
i.e., the inter vivos trust and a testamentary trust-with its conse-
quent higher fees, double accountings, income tax returns, etc. It
has not always been possible to accomplish all of these objectives in
the absence of statutory authorization; yet the increasing popularity
of the "life insurance trust," the "living trust" or "family trust"
provided the stimulus for a continued resort to "pour-over" techniques.
In the absence of a special statute, a pour-over from a will to an
inter vivos trust must depend for its validity upon either (1) the
doctrine of incorporation by reference, or (2) the doctrine of "facts
of independent significance" or "non-testamentary acts."43 If the
inter vivos trust is irrevocable and in existence when the will is
executed and the will makes appropriate references to the trust
instrument, the residuary gift can be sustained upon the doctrine of
incorporation by reference. Logically, however, this would result
in two trusts, one inter vivos and the other testamentary, because
under this doctrine it is the writing in the inter vivos trust instru-
ment which is incorporated into the will. The residuary pour-over
can also be sustained under the doctrine of independent significance
when the trust is irrevocable, if the settlor did not reserve the power
as trustee or otherwise to control beneficial enjoyment; in such
instances the trust is a fact having a significance which is independent
of a testamentary disposition. Under this theory it is the trust itself
which is the fact of independent significance, not the writing of the
trust instrument. Accordingly, the pour-over is to a single trust for
42. It would be possible to have a pour-over from the inter vivos trust to
a testamentary trust, but this is not the usual pattern of estate planning
techniques. See Trachtman, Pour-Overs, 97 TRuST AND ESTATES 416 (1958);
CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 120, problem 5.8 (3d ed. 1961).
43. For excellent references see 1 ScoTT, TRusTs § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956);
Trachtman, Pour-Overs, 97 TRusTs AND ESTATES 416 (1958); Note, Pour-over
Trusts: Consequences of Applying The Doctrines of Incorporation by Reference
and Fact of Independent Significance, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1106 (1959), re-
printed in 39 Trust Bull., Oct. 1959, p. 23; Polasky, "Pour-Over" Wills-
and The Statutory Blessing, 98 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 949 (1959).
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purposes of fiduciary administration. The difficult problem has been
with the revocable trust. There has been considerable uncertainty
and difference of opinion concerning whether or not a revocable
trust is a fact with a significance independent of a testamentary dis-
position;44 notwithstanding Professor Scott's argument that it should
be so regarded,45 the consensus seems to be that it does not have
such a significance.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-307 removes these uncertain-
ties with respect to pour-over clauses even though the trust is re-
vocable. It also makes clear that the pour-over can be made to an
inter vivos trust created by a person other than the testator. Thus
a wife or other relative can put a pour-over clause in her will which
will give her residue to a trust established by her husband. The
act expressly provides that "the devise or bequest shall not be in-
valid because the trust is amendable or revocable." This statute is a
legislative exception to the policy of the Statute of Wills; by creating
a revocable inter vivos trust and pouring over the residue under his
will to the trust the testator can thereafter amend the trust from
time to time without conforming to the wills act. Perhaps more im-
portant from the standpoint of the role of executors and lawyers,
most people are reluctant to create irrevocable trusts notwithstanding
the income and estate tax advantages, because they feel a need or a
desire to retain control. The revocable trust has no tax advantages,
but it has been the more popular form of inter vivos trust, and this
legislation will likely increase its popularity substantially. For an
extreme example, if a person is contemplating a testamentary trust,
he might be encouraged to set it up first as a revocable inter vivos
trust and watch it work during his lifetime; his will can then be
written much shorter, without disclosing the terms of the trust, but
nevertheless pouring over the residue of his estate to the trust. He
can thereafter amend the trust as he experiments with it, and since
the corpus is small, the annual trustee's commission is nominal. After
a while when he becomes accustomed to the two instruments which
now constitute his estate plan, he may become impressed with the
possible substantial savings in executor's commissions, attorneys'
fees and probate costs by transferring a larger part of his estate to
the trust during his lifetime; he still retains control and can amend
the trust without changing his will. As he grows older and his
financial needs are less, he might even be persuaded to make the
trust irrevocable during his life and thus save tax dollars as well
as probate expense dollars.
44. See references in note 43 supra.
45. Scott, Pouring Over, 37 Trust Bull. 25 (1958) and 97 TRUSTS AND ESTATES
189 (1958); 1 SCoTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
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This statute makes more obsolete the Tennessee practice of schedul-
ing probate fees for executors and attorneys as a percentile of the
"probate estate." This is particularly true with respect to attorneys'
fees. The larger part of the settlement of a decedent's estate is legal
and often concerned with the solution of tax problems, and many tax
attorneys consider the "gross estate" or the "gross income" of the
estate in arranging their fees. This permits a smaller percentile to be
used and makes for a better public relations than a very high per-
centile of an increasingly narrower concept called the "probate
estate." The pour-over statute in Tennessee does indeed have the
potentiality for a substantial impact upon (1) estate planning ar-
rangements for clients, and (2) the future role of the executor and
the lawyer in the settlement of decedent's estates.
II. TRUSTS
A. Spendthrift Trusts
Can the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust effect an assignment of
his interest in the trust by entering into a consent decree in a court
proceeding? This question was latent in Burton v. Burton,46 but the
supreme court did not discuss it. In this case a husband and wife
were divorced and a property settlement was agreed pursuant to
which the father of the husband created a trust to pay an income of
$2,400 per year to the wife "until her death or remarriage," the
balance of the income to the husband. The husband's interest in
the trust was limited by a spendthrift clause. The couple were later
remarried and shortly afterwards divorced a second time. The hus-
band apparently contended that the remarriage terminated the wife's
interest in the trust, because she filed a bill for an adjudication that
the word "remarriage" as used in the trust instrument meant re-
marriage to someone else. A consent decree was entered on this
petition in favor of the wife, but the husband then contended that he
did not have the legal capacity to enter into this consent decree
because of the spendthrift clause. The court held for the wife again,
treating the consent decree as a resolution of a latent ambiguity in
the trust instrument rather than an assignment by a spendthrift
beneficiary. There is some authority, however, that a claim for sup-
port and alimony might be regarded as an exception to the spend-
thrift trust protection. 47
46. 343 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. 1961).
47. 2 ScowT, TRusTs § 157 (2d ed. 1956).
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B. Restraint of Marriage
Harbin v. Judd48 was an interesting case. The problem was whether
or not a provision in the trust which provided for the defeasance of a
beneficiary's interest upon marriage was void as an unreasonable
restraint upon marriage. The court held the limitation valid. Ten
minor children were left a home by their grandmother under a trust
which provided that upon the marriage of a child his interest should
vest in his unmarried sisters during their unmarried state, but that
upon the marriage of the last unmarried sister, the property should
revest again in all the children and then terminate. Two of the
girls never married and the survivor of these died in 1957. All the
children were dead at the time of the action except one, and this was
a suit for partition. The court held that the purpose of the trust was
not to restrain marriage, but to provide a home for the children which
would not be broken up by the marriage of the older children. It was
thus a reasonable provision and not an unreasonable restraint on
marriage.
C. Constructive Trusts
In Williams v. Burmeister 9 the western section of the court of
appeals imposed a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a sale
of real estate by a grantee who took title under a warranty deed;
the court held that the deed transaction was really a mortgage lend-
ing situation which gave rise to an oral trust of the land, and that
the sale was a breach of fiduciary relation. Since Tennessee does
not have a statute based on section seven of the English Statute of
Frauds, a trust in real estate may be proven by parol evidence.50
D. Legislation
Chapter 337 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1961 amends Tennessee
Code-Annotated sections 34-107 and 34-108 by increasing the amount
from $500 to $1000 which a court is authorized to dispose of for the
best interests of a minor without requiring the appointment of or
distribution to a regular guardian for the minor. Chapter No. 232 of
the Tennesssee Public Acts of 1961 amends Tennessee Code Anno-
tated section 35-802 in the pocket supplement, the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act, to give the county court and chancery court concurrent
jurisdiction under this statute.
48. 340 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
49. 338 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
50. Watkins v. Watkins, 160 Tenn. 1, 22 S.W.2d 1 (1929); Kelley v. White-




A. Rule Against Perpetuities
It has been said several times in these survey articles that holo-
graphic wills are generally the most expensive wills that a client can
pay for. Such wills must also .be the most painful and frustrating
to the intended beneficiaries. Both results are well illustrated in Ross
v. Stiff,51 in which a physician prepared his own will disposing of
an estate valued at approximately a half million dollars, setting up
trusts intended .to last until the death of his last grandchild even
though born after his death (he was survived by a wife, two daugh-
ters, and grandchildren), with gifts over after the death of the last
grandchild. The chancellor, the court of appeals, and all parties to
a suit to construe the will seem to have agreed that the gift over
violated the Rule; the principal problem in the case resulted from
differing views about the effect of voiding the gift over. Separate
guardians ad litem were appointed to represent the interests of (1)
the grandchildren living at the testator's death, (2) grandchildren
born after the testator's death, and (3) all grandchildren regardless
of when born. After payment of the costs of this suit to construe the
will, including the fees of counsel and guardians ad litem, a summary
of this physician's skill in writing a will might be as follows: He left
a will which cost many thousands of dollars to interpret, and which
nevertheless frustrated both his testamentary intention and some of
the beneficiaries included in his plan.
During the life of the testator's widow the trustee was directed
to pay 30% of the income to W, the widow, 30% to D1, 20% to D2,
10% to GC', a grandchild, and 10% was to be accumulated and used
for the education of all his grandchildren whenever born. After the
death of W the trustee was directed to distribute the income 45%
to D1, 30% to D2, 15% to GC, and 10% to the educational fund for all
grandchildren. The testator directed that the trust should be kept
intact until the death of his wife and "the death of the last living
grandchild, 52 and if at that time there be no issue of his grand-
children then living, gift over to his two brothers, "and if they be
not living the corpus . .,. divided among their children. '53 The gift
over after the death of the last grandchild whenever born clearly
violated the Rule. While it was clear that the trust was intended to
last until the death of the last grandchild, there was no direction
concerning the distribution or accumulation of income after the death
of the daughters. The will is so poorly written it will not serve a
51. 338 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
52. Id. at 247.
53. Ibid.
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useful purpose to list the distributive problems which were not dealt
with. Both the chancellor and the court of appeals held that not only
the gift over after the death of the last grandchild, but also the
giftto the grandchildren must fail. The chancellor decreed that the
trust would continue until the death of the widow, and that the gift
of income thereafter to D1, D 2, and GC 1 without limitation carried
with it the fee, so that distribution of the corpus according to the
stated percentages could be made at the death of the widow. The
court of appeals affirmed.
While it is difficult to have sympathy for this badly written will,
the courts in the instant case might have saved, the trust for the
grandchildren of the testator, including those born after his death.
The Rule Against Perpetuities does not invalidate the gift to his
grandchildren, because they must all be born within the lives of his
two daughters, and thus it could have been held that they took
vested interests within the Rule. If their interests in the trust are
vested in ownership within the Rule, they are not invalid because
they are continued in trust for a period longer than that prescribed
by the Rule; at worst the beneficiaries owning vested interests at the
expiration of lives in being plus twenty-one years could compel
termination of the trust and distribution of the corpus at that time.5 4
This would have saved the corpus for all the grandchildren as opposed
to distributing it to the two daughters and one grandchild-one step
short of the testator's desires rather than two steps. In order to do
this the court would have had to construe the will so as to complete
several gaps left in the will with respect to such problems as (1)
whether income was to be distributed or accumulated for the grand-
children, (2) whether distribution to grandchildren should be per
stirpes or per capita, (3) at what times or upon what events should
distributions of income or corpus be made to grandchildren. The court
refused to write the decedent's will for him and imply the terms and
conditions of the gift to his grandchildren, and for this the court
should not be criticized. To do so is to encourage people to write
badly drafted wills. As indicated by Smith v. Weitze 5 5 in the first
part of this article, there is already too much of that in Tennessee.
B. Tennessee Class Doctrine
In Wilson v. Smith 6 the testator died in 1934 and his will gave his
54. SiIES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1393, n.18 (2d ed. 1956) and cases
cited therein points out that while there is no well formulated rule of
law restricting the duration of trusts, the trust is not subject to external
attack by the heirs; at worst, the beneficiary owning the vested equitable
interest could come into court and compel a termination and distribution
to him.
55. 338 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
56. 337 S.W.2d 456 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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estate to W his wife for life, remainder to "be equally divided be-
tween my brothers and sisters, and the children of any deceased
brother or sister, per stirpes. . .. ,"57 W died in 1957. There were cer-
tain brothers and sisters of T, and certain children of deceased
brothers and sisters, who survived T but did not survive" W. Some
of these made deeds during their lives conveying whatever interest
they might have in T's estate, and others of these left wills which
would dispose of whatever transmissable interest they might have in
T's estate, and still others died intestate. The court reversed the
Common Law and Chancery Court of Dyer County and applied the
Tennessee Class Doctrine to hold that these members of the class
who died before the future interest became a present possessory
interest did not have transmissable interests in the estate. While
the testator did not say that the remainder was given to only those
who survived his wife, the court implied a condition precedent of
survivorship.
This is the fourth consecutive year in which this survey article
has discussed an appellate decision involving the Tennessee Class
Doctrine.58 Johnson v. Span was an unreported decision of the west-
ern section of the court of appeals which applied the doctrine and
held that the members of the class owned non-transmissable future
interests which were contingent upon their survival to the time of
distribution. Karsch v. Atkins 59 was a supreme court decision holding
that because of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-305 the mem-
bers of the class "take vested transmissable interest unless the will
... manifests a clear intention to the contrary."60 Burdick v. Gilpin6'
was a supreme court decision adopting the written opinion of Judge
Howard of the court of appeals which omitted any reference to the
Karsch case and applied the doctrine that members of the class own
contingent non-transmissable interests. The instant case of Wilson v.
Smith62 also holds the interests non-transmissable. The ready infer-
ence is that the court of appeals is at least consistent in holding that
the doctrine is applicable even though there is no expression of in-
tention to make the interests of the members of the class contingent,
whereas the supreme court has reached opposite conclusions in the
last two years, apparently without realizing it. In the instant case the
57. Id. at 457.
58. See prior discussion in Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and
Future Interests-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. I, REV. 1237, 1256 (1958);
Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12
VAM. L. REv. 1157, 1175 (1959); Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future In-
terests-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 V.m. L. Rav. 1101, 1116 (1960).
59. 203 Tenn. 350, 313 S.W.2d 253 (1958).
60. Id. at 354.
61. 205 Tenn. 94, 325 S.W.2d 547 (1959).
62. 337 S.W.2d 456 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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court of appeals also does not mention the Karsch case, whose ration-
ale is just the opposite.
Perhaps the most significant development in Wilson v. Smith is the
discussion concerning the contention that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 32-305 abolished the class doctrine in Tennessee. It rejected
this contention notwithstanding the statute is entitled "An Act to so
change what is known as 'The Class Doctrine' concerning property
to be paid or distributed or divided among members of a fluctuating
class at a future time .... ." The court said that its construction of this
statute is that without abolishing the class doctrine, the statute "mere-
ly adds to membership in the class entitled to take, at the falling in of
the life estate.., the then surviving issue of anyone who would have
been a member of the class if he or she had survived until that
time."63 Thus, if a child of a deceased brother or sister of T failed to
survive W, but left issue who survived W, his interest would pass to
such issue under the statute even though such issue are not "children"
of a deceased brother or sister. Such issue would take from T under
the statute and not from their ancestor. On the other hand, if a
member of the class attempted to convey his interest by deed and
failed to survive W, the statute would have no application. This
is a significant argument and it is persuasive that the statute itself
cannot be said to be a complete abolishment of the Tennessee Class
Doctrine; at best it is only a modification of the rule with respect
to those members of the class who leave issue surviving. But for
this statute the issue would not be included in the membership of
the class.
63. Id. at 461.
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